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Abstract
Background. This study examined the structure of the self-concept in a sample of sexual
trauma survivors with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) compared to healthy controls
using a self-descriptive card-sorting task. We explored whether individuals with PTSD possess
a highly affectively-compartmentalized self-structure, whereby positive and negative self-
attributes are sectioned off into separate components of self-concept (e.g. self as an employee,
lover, mother). We also examined redundancy (i.e. overlap) of positive and negative self-
attributes across the different components of self-concept.
Method. Participants generated a set of self-aspects that reflected their own life (e.g. ‘self at
work’). They were then asked to describe their self-aspects using list of positive or negative
attributes.
Results. Results revealed that, relative to the control group, the PTSD group used a greater
proportion of negative attributes and had a more compartmentalized self-structure.
However, there were no significant differences between the PTSD and control groups in posi-
tive or negative redundancy. Sensitivity analyses demonstrated that the key findings were not
accounted for by comorbid diagnosis of depression.
Conclusion. Findings indicated that the self-structure is organized differently in those with
PTSD, relative to those with depression or good mental health.
Introduction
There are profound individual differences in the way we process and organize information
related to our self-concept – our experienced sense of self. Theoretical accounts of how the self-
concept is structured propose that it comprises multiple ‘self-aspects’ – distinct identities that are
represented by organised bodies of both declarative and episodic knowledge (e.g. Cantor and
Kihlstrom, 1987; McConnell, 2011). Self-aspects can include roles (e.g. mother, teacher) (e.g.
Roberts and Donahue, 1994), social identities (e.g. being a Muslim, a member of the UK
Labour party), social relationships (e.g. friend, wife), affective states (e.g. ‘when I’m depressed’),
behavioral situations (e.g. ‘when I’m meeting new people’), private and public selves (e.g.
Triandis, 1989), and relational and collective identities (e.g. Brewer and Gardner, 1996).
Self-aspects are conceptualized as cognitive structures containing sets of specific attributes or
beliefs (Showers et al., 2006) that prototypically include significant amounts of affect-laden
information (Cantor et al., 1986). It is proposed that different self-aspects will preside over men-
tal experiences in different contexts – what we have previously called the ‘self-in-place’ (Dalgleish
and Power, 2004). So, the ‘self with family’ self-concept would preside when an individual is with
their family, whereas the ‘depressed self’ would drive self-related experiences when the individual
is under the yoke of depressed mood. Under such circumstances, the attributes, beliefs and affect
associated with the presiding self-aspect will be more accessible relative to information pertain-
ing to self-aspects that are subordinate in that context.
Affective compartmentalization
It is proposed that self-concepts can vary in complexity across individuals. Linville (1987)
argued that a more complex self-concept is characterized by a greater number of self-aspects
and stronger distinctions or boundaries between different self-aspects, in other words, the
degree to which the self-concept is compartmentalized. There has been increasing interest
in the relationship between the structure of the self-concept and mental health, with a particu-
lar focus on how affective self-related information is organized across different self-aspects and
how this relates to different degrees of self-concept complexity.
Two aspects of how affective information is organized seem particularly important for
mental health. The first is the degree to which affective material is compartmentalized such
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that positive and negative self-attributes are segregated into separ-
ate self-aspects (Showers, 2002). For an individual with a high
degree of affective compartmentalization, any given self-aspect
(e.g. ‘self at work’, ‘self with friends’) will be dominated by either
positive (e.g. happy, confident) or negative (e.g. worried, hopeless)
self-attributes, as opposed to a self-aspect being represented by a
balance of positive and negative attributes (e.g. happy, worried).
For example, an affectively compartmentalized person may have
a positive self-aspect category (e.g. ‘self with close friends’),
which contains predominantly positive conceptualizations about
that instantiation of the self (e.g. confident, optimistic, happy
and organized). As long as such positively valenced self-aspects
are salient, these primarily positive self-beliefs will populate con-
scious awareness with consequent implications for affect and well-
being. Conversely, when negatively valenced self-aspects are sali-
ent, the phenomenology of highly compartmentalized individuals
would be dominated by negative self-beliefs. For example, for a
highly compartmentalized person with a negative self-aspect cat-
egory (e.g. ‘self at work’), it is proposed that highly accessible
negative self-related beliefs (e.g. worried, hopeless, uncomfortable
and insecure) will dominate mental life when at work.
Several authors have discussed how high levels of affective
compartmentalization may arise out of stressful or traumatic for-
mative experiences as a means of ‘ring fencing’ off toxic self-
related material from more positive self-aspects (Linville, 1987;
Morgan and Janoff-Bulman, 1994; Showers et al., 2006; cf. also
Steinberg et al., 2003). Such affective compartmentalization can
be viewed as both a protective strategy and as a vulnerability fac-
tor. When positively-valenced compartmentalized self-aspects
preside over mental life, difficult or toxic self-related information
is kept psychologically at bay, promoting experiential well-being
(Linville, 1987). However, to the extent that the individual is vul-
nerable to the self-in-place (Dalgleish and Power, 2004) being
occupied by a predominantly negative self-aspect, characterized
by self-attributes grounded in experiences of significant unre-
solved stress or trauma, then such compartmentalization repre-
sents a risk factor for mental distress or ill health.
The counterpart to this compartmentalized structure is the
notion of an integrated self-concept characterized by a mixture
of positive and negative self-attributes within most or all self-
aspects (Showers, 2002). An individual with a highly-integrated
self-concept may also endorse the self-aspect – ‘self at work,’ –
but in this case, this self-aspect would contain a balance of
both positive and negative self-content. Although such individuals
may not inhabit self-aspects with unremittingly positive content
they are also less susceptible to the toxic override potential of
highly negative self-aspects and consequently have reduced men-
tal health vulnerability. This has been corroborated across numer-
ous studies linking self-concept integration with mental health
and well-being (e.g. Showers, 1992; Showers and Kling, 1996;
Rhodewalt et al., 1998; Showers et al., 1998).
The first aim of the present study was to extend this work on
self-structure and mental health to look at individuals who
had experienced significant trauma – in this case sexual abuse
and/or assault – and who are suffering as a consequence from
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD is characterized
by negative beliefs about the self being broken or damaged in
some way by the trauma. For example, one criterion in the
DSM-5 [American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013] diagnosis
for PTSD is ‘Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expecta-
tions about oneself, others, or the world (e.g. “I am bad,” “No one
can be trusted,”)’. Sufferers of PTSD also invariably possess a rich
repertoire of psychological and behavioral strategies to protect
against potentially toxic information about their trauma and its
implication or consequences for the self. Many of these comprise
the DSM-5 avoidance symptoms of PTSD (avoiding trauma
reminders, attempts to never think about or talk about the trauma,
social withdrawal, loss of interest in activities, emotional numbing
and psychogenic amnesia) (APA, 2013). Others involve associated
phenomena such as dissociation (including depersonalization and
derealization), suppression and repression, which sufferers of
PTSD often use to inhibit the reliving symptoms and overwhelm-
ing emotions associated with the trauma (Holmes et al., 2005).
Based on these aspects of the PTSD phenotype and on the the-
oretical literature outlined above, our first hypothesis was that
individuals with PTSD following an experience or experiences
of interpersonal trauma such as sexual abuse or assault would
possess a highly affectively-compartmentalized self-structure rela-
tive to individuals who have not experienced sexual trauma and
do not suffer PTSD.
Affective redundancy
The second organizational principle relating the structure of the
self-concept to mental health is the extent to which affective self-
related knowledge shows overlap or redundancy across (Linville,
1987) different self-concepts. For example, the self may be repre-
sented as ‘worthless’ across multiple self-aspects such as ‘self as a
friend’, ‘self at work’, ‘self as a spouse’ (e.g. Dozois and Dobson,
2001a, 2001b; Linville, 1985; Dalgleish and Power, 2004). In
such circumstances, potentially toxic negative information is not
effectively confined or compartmentalized into discrete self-
aspects but pervades the individual’s entire sense of self, poten-
tially contaminating even the most positive self-aspects. In con-
trast, high redundancy of positive information would reflect a
stable positive sense of self, with beneficial consequences for men-
tal health and well-being. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, research on
the structure of the self-concept in those with clinical depression
reveals greater overall negativity, greater redundancy of negative
attributes across self-aspects, reduced positive redundancy, and
stronger affective compartmentalization than is the case for
those who have never suffered from depression. (e.g. Showers
and Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Dalgleish et al., 2011).
The second aim of the present study was to examine redun-
dancy of positive and negative self-attributes across the self-concept
in trauma-exposed individuals with PTSD and the healthy control
participants. We had a clear hypothesis regarding positive redun-
dancy, predicting that it would be reduced in the individuals with
PTSD, reflecting the absence of a stable positive sense of self. We
had no clear hypothesis regarding negative redundancy. It is plaus-
ible that the repertoire of inhibitory strategies that characterizes
PTSD would serve to corral negative self-related information into
a small number of negatively-laden self-aspects with little ‘spillover’
or redundancy with the rest of the self-concept. In contrast, it is
also plausible that the content of any negative self-attributes that
had their origins in the person’s experience of trauma would gen-
eralize to pervasive negative self-representations that populated the
entire self-concept, akin to the pervasive negativity observed in
depression (Dalgleish et al., 2011).
Self-descriptive card sort
To examine the structure of self-concept we used a self-descriptive
card-sorting task (Showers, 1992).In this card sorting procedure,
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participants are first asked to generate a set of self-aspects that
reflect their own life (e.g. ‘self at work’, ‘self when angry’).
There can be as many, or as few, self-aspects as seem relevant
to a given individual. Participants are then presented with a set
of 48 cards, each containing a trait word or phrase which is either
positive or negative in valence.
The participants are asked to sort the cards into one, many or
none of the self-generated self-aspects (Linville, 1985, 1987).1
Within this procedure the degree of negativity (Showers, 1992)
is the overall proportion of cards selected that are negative in
valence across all self-aspects, including repetitions. Redundancy
or overlap is the extent to which the same cards are used across
multiple self-aspects (Dozois and Dobson, 2001a, 2001b).
Finally, affective compartmentalization is the extent to which
positive and negative cards are allocated to distinct self-aspects
such that some self-aspects are predominantly positive, while
others are predominantly negative (Showers, 1992).
The current study
The principal focus of the present study was to examine degree of
negativity, positive and negative redundancy, and compartmental-
ization of valenced information across the self-generated self-
aspects of an individual’s self-concept, as revealed by the card
sort procedure, in a sample of participants with current PTSD
following significant interpersonal trauma, relative to healthy con-
trols who had not experienced such trauma. Although compart-
mentalisation and other effects of the self-structure may occur
following the experience of any trauma, we anticipated that
these effects would be particularly likely following sexual trauma,
due to the violation of both physical and self-integrity, and preva-
lence of more intense avoidance strategies such as dissociation,
and documented effects on the self-concept (e.g. Finkelhor and
Brown, 1985; McAlpine and Shanks, 2010).
In sum, we predicted that the PTSD group would identify the
most stressful or traumatic event in their lives as more centrally
defining in terms of how they see themselves, relative to the con-
trols, as measured by the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen and
Rubin, 2006, 2007) – a self-report inventory assessing how iden-
tified events have come to define your personal identity. In terms
of the card-sorting task, we hypothesized that all participants
would generate multiple self-aspects but that the PTSD sample
would display greater negativity across the self-concept as well
as greater compartmentalization between positive and negative
components of the self-concept, across their different self-aspects.
We also predicted that redundancy of positive information across
the different self-aspects would be reduced in those with PTSD




Power analysis was completed in G Power. We used the effect size
(d = 1.02) for the difference between healthy and depressed sam-
ples in card-sort metrics observed by Dalgleish et al. (2011), as we
anticipated that the size of the effect may be similar for the differ-
ence between PTSD and healthy samples. The calculation indi-
cated that 22 participants per group would provide 90% power
(two-tailed, α = 0.05) to detect a true effect. We therefore aimed
to recruit 22 participants into each group.
Two groups of female participants were included in the study.
Participants who had developed PTSD following sexual trauma
were allocated to a PTSD group. Current diagnosis of PTSD was
determined according to the DSM-IV (n = 23). Fifteen of these par-
ticipants were recruited from the Haven; A Sexual Assault Referral
Centre (SARC) in Paddington. Following the completion of an
assessment for counseling or psychological therapy at the Haven,
potential participants were given an information sheet for the
study, and invited to contact the researchers if they would like to
take part. Eight participants were recruited from the MRC
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Clinical Volunteer Panel – a
database of some 400 community volunteers with a history of sig-
nificant mental health problems who have agreed to help with psy-
chological research. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via
advertisements in local newspapers and through local clinics.
PTSD diagnosis and history and other Axis I and II psychiatric
comorbidity according to the DSM-IV were determined using the
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders –
Clinician Version (SCID, Version 2.0; First et al., 1996) and the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis II Personality
Disorders (Borderline, Avoidant and Dependant) (First et al.,
1997), administered by trained interviewers, under the supervision
of a Clinical Psychologist.
The female participants with no experience of sexual abuse/
assault and without PTSD (which may have occurred from
other events such as motor vehicle accidents) as determined by
the SCID (the control group; n = 22), were recruited from
the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Non-Clinical
Volunteer Panel – a database of some 2000 community volunteers
who have agreed to help with psychological research. Volunteers
are recruited to the panel via advertisements in local newspapers.
To be eligible for the study, participants had to be fluent in
English and over 18 years of age. Exclusion criteria comprised a
diagnosis of substance dependence, organic brain injury and a




The card-sorting task was adapted from Showers (1992; Showers
and Kling, 1996; Showers and Kevlyn, 1999), although the ori-
ginal task was proposed by Zajonc (1960) and subsequently
adapted by Linville (1985, 1987). First, participants were given a
description of how we define ‘self-aspects.’ Participants were
then asked to identify and describe each of their different ‘self-
aspects’. They were told that they were free to come up with as
many different self-aspects as they felt were appropriate.
Participants were given a blank table and asked to record their
self-aspects at the top of a column.
Participants were given a deck of 48 cards (listed in online
Supplementary Appendix A), shuffled anew for each participant.
Each card contained an adjective or phrase that might be used to
describe a self-aspect. Participants were asked to record which of
the cards fell under each self-aspect. Any card can be used repeat-
edly if it is relevant to more than one self-aspect, or not at all if it
is deemed irrelevant to the self. The adjectives chosen were modi-
fied from Dalgleish et al.’s (2011) study to be more specifically
trauma-related. For example, ‘feeling contaminated’, ‘feeling bro-
ken’ and ‘feeling dirty.’ The adjectives/phrases were either positive
or negative in valence (24 of each; see online Supplementary
Appendix A). Prior to the study, we had the adjectives/phrases
958 Georgina Clifford et al.
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rated (n = 15 raters) for valence on 15-point Likert scales
anchored at 1 (strongly positive), 7 (weakly positive), 8 (neutral),
9 (weakly negative), 15 (strongly negative). The positive set of
adjectives had a mean rating of 2.59 (S.D. = 0.81), whereas the
negative set of adjectives had a mean rating of 13.61 (S.D. =
1.09). A paired samples t test showed that the two sets of cards
did not differ significantly in intensity (distance from the neutral
score of 8; t < 1).
We also asked participants to think about their ‘core self’ – the
parts of their self concept that they felt were always almost experi-
entially present and that underlay their experience of their differ-
ent self-concepts. Participants were provided with a definition and
then asked to take the 48 cards and then select those which they
felt described their ‘core-self.’. We hypothesized that the core self
in our sample with PTSD would be more negatively laden than in
our control group.
Self-structure metrics
Proportion of negative items
This is the number of negative words or phrases, including repeti-
tions, appearing in the card sort, divided by the total number of
words or phrases used. It is a measure of the overall negativity of
the sort (Showers, 1992).
Compartmentalization (Showers, 1992)
The measure of compartmentalization is a phi (w) coefficient
based on a χ2 statistic (Everitt, 1977). It compares the frequencies
of positive and negative cards in each self-aspect of the card sort
to those that would be expected, given the proportion of negative
items for the sort as a whole. A frequency table is constructed that
contains as many columns as there are self-aspects in the indivi-
dual’s card sort and one row each for number of positive cards
and number of negative cards. The observed frequencies for
each cell are generated from the whole card sort. The expected fre-
quencies are generated as follows: If the card sort contained, for
example, 40% negative cards overall and the first self-aspect con-
tained 20 cards, then the expected frequencies for that aspect
would be 8 (40%) negative cards and 12 (60%) positive cards. A
χ2 statistic is then computed using these expected and observed
frequencies. This is then normalized by dividing by the number
of cards in the sort (N) as follows:
F = √x2/N
where, w can range from 0 to 1 (0 represents a perfectly random
sort, and 1 represents a perfectly compartmentalized sort).
Redundancy
Redundancy (Dozois and Dobson, 2001a, 2001b) was computed
separately for positive and negative attributes, with each redun-
dancy score representing the degree of card repetitions across self-
aspects, controlling for both the number of self-aspects in a given
card sort and the number of cards used. The following formula
generated the redundancy rates:
Redundancy = x = 1
ndw × ndg ×
∑
nri
where (using the example of negative redundancy) ndw equals the
number of distinct negative words used in an individual’s card
sort, ndg equals the number of self-aspects generated, and ∑nri
equals the sum of repetitions of each negative card up to the max-
imum of 23 cards.2
Screening and questionnaire measures
SCID-I for mood disorders; anxiety and other disorders
Axis I diagnoses according to the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) were determined by having partici-
pants complete the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV
Axis I Disorders – Clinician Version (SCID, Version 2.0; First
et al., 1996) under the supervision of a Clinical Psychologist.
The reliability and validity of the SCID-I for DSM-IV has been
reported in several published studies (e.g. Zanarini et al., 2000;
Lobbestael, et al., 2011).
SCID-II (borderline, avoidant and dependent personality
disorder sub-sections)
Diagnoses of Borderline, Avoidant and Dependent Personality
Disorder were determined by having participants complete the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders
(SCID-II; First et al., 1997). Excellent inter‐rater reliability has
been found on the SCID-II (range 0.77 to 0.94). The intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) trait scores of all personality disor-
ders were excellent, with the exception of the schizotypal, histri-
onic, narcissistic and the A criteria of antisocial personality
disorders which displayed fair inter‐rater agreement (e.g.
Lobbestael, et al., 2011).
Beck depression inventory (BDI-I; Beck et al., 1961)
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) is a
widely-used and well validated measure of depressive symptoms
over the previous week.3 The BDI demonstrates high internal con-
sistency, with alpha coefficients of 0.86 and 0.81 for psychiatric
and non-psychiatric populations respectively (Beck et al., 1988).
Internal consistency was high in the current sample (α = 0.96).
Centrality of events scale (CES-Negative; Berntsen and Rubin,
2006, 2007)
The CES-Negative (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006, 2007) measures
the extent to which a negative or traumatic memory forms a cen-
tral component of personal identity, a turning point in the life
story, and a reference point for everyday inferences. We used
the full version, which consists of 20 items rated on 5-point scales
(1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree) in relation to the most
stressful or traumatic event in the person’s life. The CES-negative
is positively correlated with severity of PTSD symptoms, and this
relationship remains significant when controlling for measures of
anxiety, depression, dissociation, and self-consciousness (Berntsen
and Rubin, 2006; 2007). Internal consistency for the CES was
high in the current sample (α = 0.98).
Procedure
Ethics approval was obtained from the NHS National Research
Ethics Service (reference 11/H0305/1). Participants completed
the experimental session individually and face-to-face with the
experimenter, in a quiet, private testing room, with only the
experimenter present. Following provision of written informed
consent, participants completed the SCID and several self-report
questionnaire measures of mood and PTSD symptoms. In a
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separate session, approximately a week later, they completed the
self-structure card sort. Participants were instructed to take
their time in completing the tasks and were repeatedly reminded
that they could stop at any time if they felt distressed. However, all
participants finished their testing sessions and reported experien-
cing manageable levels of distress throughout the session, in
response to experimenter queries.
Results
Participant characteristics
According to the SCID, of the 23 participants in the PTSD group,
nine also met the criteria for a current episode of Major Depressive
Disorder (MDD), 19 met the criteria for a past episode of MDD,
one for current panic disorder (secondary to PTSD), four for cur-
rent Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and two for current
Avoidant Personality Disorder. Due to the complex nature of
our participants’ trauma histories and their experience of repeated
events, we were not able to obtain an accurate estimation of time
since the last traumatic event. During the SCID, the median num-
ber of experienced traumatic events was ‘too many to count’. In
the control group, one participant met the criteria for a current
episode of MDD and five met the criteria for a past episode of
MDD. The participant in the control group who met criteria for
a current episode of MDD was excluded from the analyses.
Descriptive group data are presented in Table 1. The groups
did not differ significantly in age, t(42) = 1.41, p = 0.17, d = 0.44;
95% CIs (−0.03 to 2.63), nor in education level, t(42) = 1.75,
p = 0.09, d = 0.54; 95% CIs (−0.17 to 2.77), although there was
tendency for the PTSD group to report fewer years in education.
There were the expected differences in BDI scores between the
PTSD and Control groups (BDI: t(24.01) = 7.35, p < 0.001, d = 3.00;
95% CIs (−2.16 to 4.76); and support for our first hypothesis
that the PTSD group would identify the negative events they
had experienced as more self-defining on the CES: t(37.63) = 6.79,
p < 0.001), d = 2.21; 95% CIs (−1.67 to 4.27).
Self-structure
All participants were able to come up with multiple self-aspects
(range 2–15). Examples of self-aspects were ‘self at work’, ‘self
with close friends’, self with men’, and ‘self at home.’
The self-structure data are presented in Table 2 and Fig. 1. The
groups were not significantly different on the total number of self-
aspects generated, t(42) = 1.02, p = 0.31, d = 0.31; 95% CIs (0.19–
2.41), nor the total number of cards used, t(42) = 1.54, p = 0.13,
d = 0.48; 95% CIs (−0.09 to 2.69), although participants in the
PTSD group used numerically more cards on average. This sug-
gests comparable engagement in the task across groups and indi-
cates that any group differences on the structure metrics
considered below, which nevertheless control for overall numbers
of self-aspects and cards used, were not likely to be a function of
the number of self-aspects generated.
There were broad ranges of scores across both groups on the
four self-structure metrics (maximum possible range 0 to 1) sug-
gesting that across-group floor and ceiling effects were not at
work in the data: Proportion of Negative Cards: 0.02–0.92;
Negative Redundancy: 0–0.67; Positive Redundancy: 0.18–0.74;
and Compartmentalization: 0 to 1. In illustration of the raw
data, online Supplementary Appendix B shows two examples
of actual card sorts from participants in the control
group illustrating relatively high and low levels of Affective
Compartmentalization. Of particular note is how, in the integrated
card sort example illustrating relatively low Compartmentalization
(online Supplementary Appendix B1), several of the self-aspects
contain positive and negative descriptors that are diametrically
opposite in meaning.
The first analysis assessed whether, overall, self-structure dif-
fered across the two groups. To that end we conducted a
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with the four self-
structure metrics as the dependent variables.
There was a statistically significant difference in the self-
structure components based on group, Wilk’s Λ = 0.41, F(4, 39) =
13.85, p = 0.00, ηp
2 = 0.59.
Follow-up Univariate ANOVAs showed a significantly
greater Proportion of Negative cards [F(1, 42) = 36.14, p = 0.00,
ηp
2 = 0.46; 90% CIs (0.26, 0.59)] and significantly greater
Compartmentalization [F(1, 42) = 12.50, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.23;
90% CIs (0.07, 0.39)] for the PTSD group. There were no
significant differences between groups for Positive or Negative
Redundancy, Fs < 1
Sensitivity analysis examining the effects of comorbid
depression
It is possible that that experience of comorbid clinical depression
may have impacted our results. To minimise any variance attrib-
utable to comorbid depression, we set aside the nine participants
with a comorbid diagnosis of MDD from the PTSD group in
order to perform a sensitivity analysis addressing this possibility.
When we reran the analyses with the remaining PTSD sample, the
self-structure metrics were similar to the whole sample (n = 14;
see Table 3). Specifically, a MANOVA with the four self-structure
metrics again revealed a statistically significant difference in
the self-structure components based on group, Wilk’s Λ = 0.46,
F(4, 30) = 8.99, p = 0.00, ηp
2 = 0.55. Univariate ANOVAs again
showed a significantly greater proportion of negative cards
used, F(1, 33) = 26.28, p = 0.00, ηp
2 = 0.44; 90% CIs (0.22, 0.59)
and significantly greater compartmentalization [F(1, 33) = 14.42,
p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.30; 90% CIs (0.10, 0.47)], for the PTSD group.






Years in education 14.87 (2.32) 16.05 (2.13)
Age in years 35.87 (14.03) 30.19 (12.54)
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I) 24.77 (12.83) 3.95 (3.37)
Centrality of Events (CES) Total
score
80.00 (15.49) 42.76 (20.07)







Number of self-aspects (range 2–15) 6.70 (2.98) 5.90 (2.02)
Cards used in sort (range 10–229) 75.04 (56.69) 53.90 (28.19)
Cards per self aspect (range 1–36) 10.59 (6.11) 9.27 (4.01)
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There was again no significant difference between groups on
positive or negative redundancy, Fs < 1.
Core self data
The core-self data are presented in Table 4. The groups were not
significantly different on the total number of cards used, t(42) =
1.05, p = 0.30, d = 0.32; 95% CIs (0.17–2.43). As anticipated, the
PTSD group used a significantly greater proportion of negative
cards to describe their core self, t(34.38) = 3.32, p = 0.002, d = 1.13;
95% CIs (−0.83 to 3.43).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine the structure of self-
concept in a sample of sexual trauma survivors with PTSD com-
pared to healthy controls using a self-descriptive card-sorting task
(Showers, 1992). Consistent with our predictions, across self-
aspects, the PTSD group used a greater proportion of negative
cards and had a more compartmentalized self-structure than
the control group. However, in contrast to our predictions,
there were no significant differences between the PTSD and
control group in positive redundancy. We also found no group
differences for negative redundancy, where we had no clear pre-
dictions. We also demonstrated, unsurprisingly, that those with
PTSD characterized their ‘core self’ as more negative relative to
the healthy control group. The pattern of findings on the card-
sorting task was not simply a function of different numbers of
self-aspects or number of cards used across the group, because
there were no significant differences on these variables. To
account for the previously established effects of depression
(Dalgleish et al., 2011) on self-structure, we set aside the partici-
pants with a comorbid diagnosis of MDD from the PTSD group
and the resultant sensitivity analyses showed that the key findings
were unchanged, indicating that the results are not accounted for
by depression comorbidity.
As noted in the Introduction, a number of authors have sug-
gested that the higher levels of affective compartmentalization
may arise out of stressful or traumatic experiences as a way of
‘ring fencing’ off what tends to be highly distressing negative self-
related material from more positive self-aspects (Linville, 1987;
Morgan and Janoff-Bulman, 1994; Showers et al., 2006; cf. also
Steinberg et al., 2003). So, for an individual with PTSD following
a sexual trauma, a particular self-aspect, such as ‘self with men’,
which encompassed feelings of shame, hopelessness and insecur-
ity might be compartmentalized or split off from other self-
aspects, such as ‘self with close friends,’ which were associated
with more positive affect.
The fact that we found no support for a difference in negative
redundancy between our groups suggests that in our sample with
Fig. 1. Mean (S.E.) performance ( y-axis) for the PTSD and control groups for Proportion of Negative cards used, Positive and Negative Redundancy, and
Compartmentalization across their multiple self-aspects.
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of scores on the self-structure metrics
















0.42 (0.13) 0.19 (0.13) 0.44
Negative redundancy 0.31 (0.11) 0.27 (0.16) 0.02
Positive redundancy 0.39 (0.15) 0.40 (0.13) 0.003
Compartmentalization 0.79 (0.22) 0.51 (0.22) 0.30
Table 4. Mean (and standard deviation) total number of cards and proportion






Core Self – total number of cards 9.83 (7.03) 7.95 (4.33)
Core Self – proportion of Negative
Words
0.38 (0.31) 0.14 (0.16)
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PTSD, distressing or toxic information relating to past traumatic
experiences is compartmentalized across the self-structure, rather
than pervading the individual’s entire sense of self. In this way,
negative material is prevented from contaminating the other,
more positive self-aspects. This finding contrasts with previous
research in individuals with clinical depression who were found
to demonstrate greater overall negativity, greater redundancy of
negative attributes across self-aspects, reduced positive redundancy,
and stronger affective compartmentalization than those who had
never suffered from depression. (e.g. Showers and Zeigler-Hill,
2007; Dalgleish et al., 2011). This suggests that the self-structure
is organized differently in those with PTSD, relative to depression.
Similarly, based on these earlier depression findings, we had
predicted that positive redundancy would be reduced in those
with PTSD relative to controls, reflecting a reduced stable positive
sense of self. However, this was not the case. Our results suggest
that, although the overall positivity across the self-structure is
lower in those with PTSD, as one would expect given the severe
and distressing nature of the disorder, and the positive informa-
tion is more compartmentalized, the positive content that is repre-
sented is as consistent across the self-structure as it is healthy
participants. Again, this suggests clear differences between the
self-structure of those with PTSD compared to those with depres-
sion. Without a control group with a complex trauma history but
no mental health issues, it is difficult to determine whether this
unique self-structure results from the experience of PTSD per
se, or is due to the experience of multiple interpersonal traumas.
Either way, current findings do indicate that distortions in self-
structure observed in those with a sexual trauma history is distinct
from patterns of self-structure in other mental health disorders.
From our results, it appears that compartmentalization
may function to protect positive self-concept, as the consistency
of positive content was preserved in our PTSD sample.
However, longitudinal research is necessary to evaluate whether
compartmentalization of the self-structure is a protective or vul-
nerability factor for symptom development. In turn, such research
may demonstrate the clinical utility of actively encouraging
trauma-exposed individuals to compartmentalize v. integrate dif-
ferent aspects of the self.
The study has some potential limitations. Although we did ask
participants to generate their own self-aspects, we did not ask
them to generate their own descriptive words to assign to the
cards used in the sorting task. This was because we wanted to
ensure that there were comparable numbers of positive and nega-
tive cards to select from and also to ensure that the intensity of
descriptors was comparable across participants so that we could
draw conclusions about the structure of the self-concept as
opposed to the language used to describe it. Future studies
could ask participants to provide their own adjectives to describe
each self-aspect, that could then be rated in terms of valence and
coded using metrics similar to those employed here (Rubin and
Bernsten, 2003).
The second issue is that our clinical group and control group
differed in two key ways. The clinical group consisted of a sample
of individuals who experienced sexual abuse and/or assault and
who, as a consequence, had developed PTSD. Our controls com-
prised individuals who did not report traumas of this nature and
who did not meet criteria for PTSD. This means that it is not pos-
sible to disentangle whether it is the development of PTSD rather
than the trauma history, per se, that can account for differences in
negative material and compartmentalization. The reason for this
is that it is very difficult to find individuals with this kind of
trauma history, at the level of severity of our sample, who are
without any mental health problems and so any trauma-matched
control group would likely present with significant symptoms of
PTSD (alongside diagnoses of other disorders) even though
they might not meet criteria for a full diagnosis. Future studies
could examine the replicability of the effects with survivors of
more discrete or less severe trauma to seek to disentangle the
experience of trauma from the presence of PTSD. Such studies
would also speak to the generalizability of the effects from severe
interpersonal trauma to other trauma categories.
A third issue is that the sample sizes for the two groups were
modest as is often the case for hard-to-recruit clinical samples.
However, there is no suggestion in the pattern and magnitude
of the results that lack of statistical power is responsible for any
of the findings. The samples were also all female. It is now
important to replicate the findings with larger samples including
individuals with PTSD who have experienced different traumas
and who are male. And finally, although we draw conclusions
about the self-structure in PTSD relative to depression based on
comparisons with the previous literature, we have not directly
compared a PTSD (with no comorbid depression) group to a clin-
ically depressed (with no comorbid PTSD) group.
In summary, the present study used an established card-
sorting task to examine degree of negativity, positive and negative
redundancy, and compartmentalization of valenced information
across the self-generated self-aspects of an individual’s self-
concept in a female sample of individuals with PTSD relative to
healthy controls. The data revealed a greater proportion of nega-
tive cards and a more compartmentalized self-structure in indivi-
duals with PTSD, compared to a non-clinical control group, but
provided no support for differences in positive or negative redun-
dancy. This is consistent with literature proposing that high levels
of affective compartmentalization may arise out of stressful or
traumatic experiences as a way of ‘ring fencing’ off negative self-
related material from the more positive self-aspects. These data fit
with our understanding of PTSD and the mechanisms involved,
such as avoidance and dissociation, that are used to inhibit the
negative impact of past traumatic experiences.
Notes
1 For example, a card may contain the adjective ‘confident’ and, during the
card sort, the participant would decide how many, if any, of his/her self-
aspects could be described in this way and allocate that card accordingly.
2 The prototypical work on self-structure by Linville (1985, 1987) used a met-
ric of ‘self-complexity,’ which is a combination of overlap or redundancy
across self-aspects and the overall numbers of self-aspects generated.
However, self-complexity is highly correlated with numbers of different
cards used in each card sort (Woolfolk et al., 1995), which militates against
its use. We did not anticipate group differences in numbers of self-aspects gen-
erated in the present study and we were careful to match our groups on mean
age. For these reasons among others (Dozois and Dobson, 2001a, 2001b;
Rafaeli-Mor et al., 1999), we did not use the self-complexity metric in the pre-
sent study.
3 The original BDI was preferred here over updated versions for legacy reasons
because the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Panel has an exten-
sive historical database of original BDI scores that can be used when recruiting
for studies.
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